Cosmological Argument, Principle of Sufficient Reason and Radical Monism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448Vol7Iss2a454Keywords:
Principle of Sufficient Reason, Radical Monism, Cosmological Argument, Metaphysical Explanation, Bradley’s Regress.Abstract
The cosmological argument in its rationalist variant is composed of at least two fundamental premises: the premise according to which there are beings explained by other beings and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Both premises are plausible taken individually. The problem is that taken together they lead to an irrational result. Here I propose to sacrifice one of the aspects of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, precisely that aspect that leads us to such an irrational result. But this sacrifice implies accepting that the cosmological argument fails in its fundamental purpose.
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