Intuition, Rationality and Action
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448Vol4Iss1a348Keywords:
Experimental Philosophy, Intuition, Thought Experiments, Rationality, Metaphilosophy.Abstract
Over the last five years, one main topic of discussion in the epistemological area has been the role of intuitions as a reliable guide to knowledge, or as a way of justification for some belief. It is assumed that if there is no such role of intuitions (rational intuitions specifically), then they are gratuitous, irrelevant, and an unreliable guide to knowledge or belief. The role of intuitions on the practical area does not simplify the problem: If a subject (S) takes a decision founded (even partially) in some intuitions, then it is difficult to deny the relevance of them in this practical area. Thus, the dilemma arises: How can an intuition guide the action of subject S, if S is not even justified in having that intuition? I propose a hybrid defense (a priori – a posteriori/ theoretical – practical) of rational intuition (RI), through two roles (different of evidential or justifier roles): a propaedeutic role (also called a contrafactual exemplifier role) and a guidance action role. At the same time, I affirm that RI has a transmitter role (different from justifier role) which is relevant concerning the inferential link between premise-conclusion. A similar connection is discussed about the conceivable – possible topic. This way, I propose a moderate rationalism, which sustains the fallibility of RI, the relevance of a posteriori evidence, and a priori reliability.
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