PERSONAL IDENTITY, DIALOGUE AND EXTENSION: WHY THERE IS NO SELF WITHOUT THE OTHERS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15691/0718-5448Vol7Iss1a154Keywords:
Andy Clark, amnesia, Charles Taylor, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, personal identity, selfAbstract
In this paper I propose a concept of the self that allows us to address and solve some of the issues associated with problem of diachronic personal identity. That is, by virtue of what can we consider that I am today the same person I was yesterday? The problem of continuity in time of identity has a long history in analytic philosophy. I argue that the continuity of personal identity over time can be ensured by resorting to the concept of “extended self as the center of gravity” presented here. My central argument is that a person does not know and is not in control of her personal identity. Identities are not dependent on particular individuals, but always extend outward toward others. Therefore, the continuity of my identity is guaranteed by the others.
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