The Objective Value of the Natural World in the Rationalist Cosmologies of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz

Abstract

The paper presents and analyses three possible ways of thinking about the value of nature objectively, corresponding to three interpretations of the principal figures of early modern rationalism: Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. While all three propose a notion of nature’s value that is not subjectively mediated, their metaphysical and cosmological theories differ radically, resulting in very different conceptions of objective value. The advantages and disadvantages of these interpretations are assessed, focusing on their consistency and suitability as candidates for a robust conception of nature's objective value. It is shown that the Cartesian model, which is based on voluntarist theology, conceives a notion of value that is independent of human valuers. However, it fails to provide a means for humans to judge objective value for themselves. Spinoza rejects the idea that traditional properties such as goodness or beauty have any real basis in nature. Instead, he seeks an objective value intrinsic to nature itself, namely, the power to exist. Thus, Spinoza offers a non-anthropocentric solution that is accessible, yet restricted, for humans to evaluate nature. Finally, Leibniz’s theory permits human access to nature’s values as traditionally understood. Nonetheless, this advantage comes with the potential drawback of an arguably anthropocentric conception of value.